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The "Right of Castle" and Prohibition
Enforcement *
By FORREST RvERE BIAciK
The world has moved since James Otis made his im-
passioned protest against the use, by British officials, of
the writ of assistance. John Adams, who was present, was
impressed by this eloquent defense of the "right of castle"
and in a letter fifty-six years later said, "American inde-
pendence was then and there born." It is a commonplace
observation that during the last decade especially, our legis-
latures have been constantly expanding the police power at
the expense of the due process conception. In the process of
creating morality by law, it is being discovered that Bills
of Rights, state and federal are being denaturized. Lovers
of liberty are asking, "Can this tendency toward arbitrary
poiver be checked, or will it rise to the dignity of an evolu-
tionary process?" In this change of emphasis from rights
to duties, it seems that the courts have attempted in some
instances to outrun the legislatures. Old landmarks in te
law are crumbling before this combined assault. It is our
purpose to deal briefly with four judicial decisions that have
made serious inroads into the doctrine of the "right of
castle"; Dowling v. Collins, South Carolina v. Seabrook and
Harringtou, Olmstead v. United States, and Burdeau v.
McDowall.
Dowling v. Collins' was an action in chancery in the
U. S. District Court for the eastern District of Kentucky,
for the return of a quantity of liquor seized by the defen-
dant, a prohibition director, at the home and residence of
the plaintiff in Lawrenceburg, Kentucky, on the night of
March 26, 1923. The plaintiff is the widow of John M.
Dowling, who at the time of his death in 1903 was the owner
of two distilleries near Lawrenceburg. After his death Mrs.
Dowling, the plaintiff, continued to operate the distilleries
"until prohibition became effective" (sic). At this time Mrs.
Dowling made inquiry of the prohibition administration
1 The District Court case is not reported in the Federal Reporter.
* This is one chapter of a book soon to be published under the general caption "Ill-
Starred Prohibition Cases."
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for the State of Kentucky as to the necessary legal proce-
dure to protect the large store of liquor on hand. She was
informed that she could either place it in a bonded ware-
house or keep it in her own cellar for the use of her family
and guests.. A considerable quantity of pre-prohibition
whisky was stored in her cellar at the time of the seizure.
The Dowling home is one of the show places of Law-
renceburg, being a Large three-story brick residence contain-
ing fifteen or twenty rooms. The plaintiff had lived in this
house for nearly fifty years. Her family had been raised there
and at the time of the seizure she and several other members
of her family were living there. The United States District
Attorney contended that because the plaintiff used one room
of this residence as a private office and kept a desk and cer-
tain business papers there, this fact changed the status of
the building as a residence, and brought it within one of the
exceptions recognized in Section 25 of the Prohibition Act.
He further contended that inasmuch as this building Was
being used for "business purposes' it could be raided and
searched without a warrant.
The Hon. A. IMI. J. Cochran, United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, upheld the
contentions of the District Attorney and this doctrine was
affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.2 A writ of certiorari was denied by the Su-
preme Court of the United States.3
It should be noted that the raiding officers had a war-
rant but it was contended that the warrant was invalid, and
neither the District nor the Circuit Court of Appeals judges
attempted to defend the validity of the warrant. The status
of the officers under this "warrant" was therefore the same
as if no warrant had been -issued. Judge Mack, speaking
for the Circuit Court of Appeals said, "We concur fully in
the findings of the trial judge that, irrespective of the valid-
ity of the search warrant, the search and seizure under the
circumstances was not unreasonable. It was not the private
dwelling, but the business building that was searched, and
it was in the basement of that business building that the
liquor was found."4
2 10 Fed. Rep. (2d) 62.
3 46 Sup. Court Rep. 356.
4 10 Fed. Rep. (2d) at p. 64.
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In the basement of this home the officers found 478
sacks, each containing twelve quarts of whisky. The prop-
erty, which was soon to be confiscated, was placed there on
the advice of one of the prohibition officials. There was no
feature of the case demanding immediate action. The offi-
cers, if they had probable cause to believe that this liquor
was being sold illegally, should have been required to obtain
a valid warrant before the search and seizure could be made.
The legal implications of this case are far reaching. If this-
is the law, then let it be understood that nearly all profes-
sional and business men, who have a library or den (it is
immaterial how they designate the room) in which they
conduct some business and keep some private business
papers, thereby lose the security of the "right of castle" as
guaranteed them by the law of the land.
Another case that has cut a deep inroad into the doc-
trine of the "right of castle" is South Carolina v. Seabrook
and Iarrington.5 This case is the logical and inevitable
sequel to the doctrine in Carroll v. United States6 which
holds that where officers have reason to. believe that liquor
is being transported illegally, they have the right to enter
upon and search such SUSPECTED vehicles without a
warrant.
In May, 1925, in the County of Beaufort, South Caro-
lina, Federal Prohibition Agent Seabrook and State Con-
stable Harrington were informed of the expectancy of a
shipload of liquor. About midnight, seeing what they
thought to be a signal, they approached the houseboat of
J. D. Pittman and supposing the Pittman boat to be the
one referred to by the informer, they boarded it. and were
in the act of crawling along the deck when they wer-dis-
covered by the owner. When Mr. Pittman discovered them
the officers called out to him to hold up his hands, declaring
that they desired to search the boat. The owner, instead of
doing as commanded, went into the cabin, secured a gun,
and fired at the prowlers, whereupon the trespassing officers
returned the fire and killed him.
The investigation established several indisputable facts.
(1) The officers had no warrant authorizing them to make
5 United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina decided in
the Octobtr, 1925, term at Charleston, South Carolina, before the Hon. Ernest F.
Cochran and not reported in the Federal Reporter.
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
a search. (2) The boat was not the one supposed to be
carrying liquor. (3) The "boat" was not floating on the
water. It was supported by blocks. (4) The boat was oc-
cupied by Pittman as a house. This poor, friendless trap-
per had no other home.
Federal Judge Ernest F. Cochran, after hearing the
evidence, did not allow the case to go to the jury. He di-
rected a verdict of justifiable homicide in self-defense and
expressed the view that the officers were within their rights
in their methods of boarding the craft and of invading the
home of Pittman at the midnight hour. These killers are
at large. They are being paid by the public. The decision
of a United States court proclaiins them to be free-to
repeat the South Carolina tragedy, if they so please!
Chief Justice Taft in the Carroll case7 had laid down
the proposition that where officers have reason to believe that
liquor is being transported illegally, they have the right
to stop, enter, and search such vehicles without a warrant.
Judge Cochran extends the Carroll doctrine so that it now
reads, "Where officers have probable cause to believe that
liquor is being transported illegally, they have the right with-
out warrant to enter and search such SUSPECTED ve-
hicles." The Fourth Amendment was intended to protect
"persons, houses, papers and effects." The logical implica-
tions of the Carroll doctrine left only "houses" unscathed.
By attempting to introduce into the law the recognition of
the maxim, "Once a boat, always a boat," the latter case
represents a further stealthy encroachment.
The next case to be briefly considered is the wire-tap-
ping case, Olmstead v. United States.s By a five to four
decision the Supreme Court held that wire tapping was
not a search or seizure within the meaning'of the Fourth
Amendment because that Amendment only protected "ma-
terial things," to-wit: "Persons, houses, papers and effects."
The effect of this decision is to hold that no case of wire
tapping by federal officials can violate the Fourth Amend-
ment even though consummated by trespass, force or fraud.
The court further held without stating any reason therefor,
6 267 U. S. 132.
7 ibid (6).
8 277 U. S. 438.
THE NoTRE DAME LAWYER
that without the sanction of an act of Congress, it was help-
less and had no discretion to exclude the evidence so secured.
Justice Holmes in a dissent which is "a model of Saxon
English and pointed brevity" declares, "For those who
agree with me, no distinction can be taken between the gov-
ernment as prosecutor and the government as judge. If the
existing code does not permit district attorneys to have a
hand in such dirty business it does not permit the judge to
allow such iniquities to succeed. . . . Te are free to choose
between two principles of policy .... For my part, I think
it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that
the Government should play an ignoble part."
Justice Brandeis, in an able and vigorous dissent pro-
tests against.this latest invasion of the "right of castle" and
declares that "as a means of espionage, writs of assistance
and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny
and oppression when compared with wire-tapping." Bran-
deis the Justice thus has the opportunity in this case to apply
the doctrine that he was instrumental in formulating thirty-
seven years before.9 In a prophetic utterance that will rank
with James Otis' protest against the writ of assistance,
Brandeis says, "Our Government is -the potent, the omni-
present teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Govern-
ment becomes a law breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the crimi-
nal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the
Government may commit crimes in order to secure the con-
viction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribu-
tion. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should reso-
lutely set its face."
The fourth case in this series of decisions that makes
a further stealthy encroachment on the "right of castle" is
Burdeau v. McDowell.Y Here the plaintiff's private papers
were stolen. The thief, to further his own ends, delivers
them to an officer of the United States. The Government,
aware of the outrage, retains the papers as evidence against
9 4 H. L. R. 193 (1890) The Right to Privacy-Brandeis and Warren.
10 256 U. S. 465.
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the plaintiff who is thereupon convicted. This decision has
placed a premium on lawlessness and has given aid and
comfort to the law enforcement enthusiast who is interested
solely in. the enforcement, of one law.
Justice Brandeis and Holmes in a powerful dissent
declared; "Respect for law will not be advanced by resort
in its enforcement to means which shock the common man's
sense of decency and fair play. At the foundation of our
civil liberty lies the principle which denies to governmental
officials an exceptional position before the law and which
subjects them to the same rules of conduct that are com-
mands to the citizen." Do not be surprised if there is created
a peace-time twin of the war-time American Protective
League. 1 Who is bold enough to assert that there will be
no law enforcement patriots, who still glory in the malo-
dorous deeds of the A.P.L. eager and ready to again ex-
press their Americanism in the new prohibition spy army
acting as an auxiliary to the United States Department of
Justice.
Yes, the world has moved since James Otis thundered
against the excesses of arbitrary power. As evidence of a
century and a half of "progress" in our political thinking,
compare the eloquet declaration of*the. Earl of Chatham
that "A man's home is his castle" with the latest declaration
of Ex-Governor Pierce of Oregon, "We claim the right to
go into .any place at any time as SECRET agents and dis-
cover if possible, violations of the law.... Keep your house
in such order that you will be glad to welcome the inspector."
Do we have a right to hope that the pendulum will
swing back to the freeman's doctrine of the past?
11 See Emerson Hough's official history of the A.P.L. "The Web."
